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vs. 
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SMITH, y 
and Respondent.) 
Case No. 20458 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues are presented for review in this 
appeal: 
1. In an action for divorce, did the trial court err 
in concluding that property acquired by gift from wifefs 
parents, and conveyed to both spouses, must be considered as 
a part of the marital estate? 
2. Did the trial court misapply the parol evidence 
rule in rejecting evidence from the wife's father to explain 
why the gift was made in the name of both spouses? 
3. Did the trial court err in failing to award the 
wife other assets that she brought into the marriage? 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This was an action for divorce in which the contested 
issues involved the disposition of marital assets. The 
principal asset of the marriage was a home in which the par-
ties resided during most of their five-year marriage. The 
home was constructed by the parties upon a lot given to them 
by the plaintiff-wife1s parents. Plaintiff claimed in this 
action that the lot was not an asset that had been acquired 
through the joint efforts of the parties, and since it was a 
gift from her parents, and in effect an advance on her in-
heritance, that the value of the lot should be awarded to 
her. Defendant-husband claimed on the other hand that since 
the lot had been deeded by plaintiff's parents to both par-
ties, that it should be awarded to both of them. The trial 
court adopted the husband's position and awarded the pro-
ceeds from the sale of the lot to both parties (R-119, 125). 
In making this award, the Court concluded that plaintiff was 
barred by reason of the parol evidence rule from having her 
father explain the reason for the gift (T-94). The trial 
court believed that in dealing with the diposition of this 
property he could not consider anything beyond the four 
corners of the written document evidencing the gift (T-94). 
In addition to the above, the evidence established that 
the wife contributed $10,000.00 toward the construction 
costs of the home, which amount was obtained from a savings 
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account and from the proceeds of the sale of other property 
that she owned prior to the marriage (T-19, 21, 22). The 
trial court considered this as a contribution to the marri-
age upon which she should not be reimbursed at dissolution 
(T-110; R-116). 
It is the wife's position on appeal that the trial 
court committed manifest error in not awarding to her the 
value of the lot given by her parents, and the assets that 
she brought into the marriage. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and defendant were married in September, 1977 
(T-7). Both spouses had been married before, and both had 
children from a prior marriage (T-26). No children were 
born as issue of this marriage (T-10). The parties develop-
ed difficulties in their marriage and separated in December 
of 1982 (T-10), although the divorce was not tried until 
September of 1984. 
Shortly after the marriage, in December, 1977, the 
plaintiff's parents, Frank and Afton Armstrong, gave the 
parties an interest in a one acre lot upon which it was ex-
pected that they would construct a home. The lot that was 
the subject of the gift was part of a six acre parcel where 
the Armstrong family had resided since 1938 (T-14, 91). 
Plaintiff was an only child (T-14). Plaintiff's mother was 
80 years old and her father 84 years old (T-14). In making 
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the gift, the parents wanted to have their daughter close by 
(T-13). The property was part of the family homestead which 
had existed all of plantiff's life, and it was always known 
that the property would eventually be hers (T-18). The gift 
of the lot was reduced to a written Memorandum of Agreement 
(Exhibit 10) .1 The written agreement reflected that it 
was the intention of Mr. and Mrs. Armstrong to give the 
parties a one-half interest in the lot.2 The Armstrongs 
retained the other one-half interest but agreed to claim no 
monetary interest in any improvements to be built upon the 
property. They also retained a first right of refusal to 
purchase the property if it were ever offered for sale. 
Deeds to the property were executed in accordance with the 
terms of the Memorandum of Agreement (T-16). 
The value of the one acre lot was disputed,3 however, 
the Court found the value to be $135,000 (or $67,500 for the 
one-half interest). In determining valuation, the Court 
1
 See Appendix A for full copy of Memorandum of 
Agreement. 
2
 The one-half interest in the lot retained by the 
Armstrongs was not disputed, and it was stipulated that upon 
post divorce sale of the property the value of the one-half 
interest would be paid to them (T-3). It is only the 
one-half interest that is the subject of the gift that is in 
dispute in this case. 
3
 Plaintiff testified that the lot value was $150,000. 
Defendant testified that the lot value was $100,000. 
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accepted the testimony of Gary F. Free, a professional 
appraiser (T-100, 108); (R-115). Frank Armstrong, plain-
tiff's father and donor of the gift, was called as a wit-
ness. The Court, believing that it could not look beyond 
the four corners of Exhibit 10 (Appendix A), refused to 
permit Mr. Armstrong to explain the reasons for the gift 
(T-94). Plaintifffs offer of proof showed that had Mr. 
Armstrong been permitted to respond, he would have testified 
that the gift was made to both parties because his daughter 
asked him to make it that way for financing purposes; and 
that the parties needed the property in both names in order 
to get a construction mortgage (T-95J.4 Further, he would 
have testified that the gift was made within approximately 
three months of the marriage and that he had absolutely no 
reason of any kind to make a gift of this magnitude to the 
defendant, except for the fact that the defendant was 
married to his daughter (T-96). 
After the gift of the lot, the parties proceeded with 
the construction of a home. Defendant-husband was in the 
construction business and operated a company known as Vico 
Building Specialities (T-30). Defendant, through his 
company, acted as the general contractor on the home (T-29). 
4
 Earlier testimony was to the effect that the gift was 
made to both spouses only because plaintiff requested that 
it be made that way for loan purposes (T-16). 
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A construction loan was obtained from Western Savings & Loan 
Association in the amount of $55,000.00. In addition to the 
loan proceeds of $55,000.00, Western required the parties to 
advance $10f000.00 into the construction account so that the 
total construction proceeds would amount to $65,000.00. 
Plaintiff-wife contributed the $10,000.00 from her separate 
funds. These funds were traced from a savings account of 
$2,249.87 that plaintiff owned prior to the marriage (T-19) 
and $7,619.19 from the proceeds of a sale of other property 
that plaintiff owned prior to the marriage (T-21, 22).5 
At the time of the divorce, the mortgage balance at Western 
was approximately $52,000.00 (T-ll). 
During the construction of the home, defendant claimed, 
through his company, to have contributed some $32,000.00 to 
the cost of construction over and above the amount of the 
construction loan. This claim was vigorously disputed by 
the plaintiff. During cross examination, it was acknow-
ledged that the husband had merely gone through the company 
check register and made a list of whatever expenses he 
thought might be attributable to the house. When confront-
ed, however, with copies of the actual check vouchers, it 
5 Husband disputed that wife put up the $10,000.00 to 
Western Savings & Loan, but had no explanation where the 
$10,000.00 came from (T-31). The Court's findings acknow-
ledge that these contributions were made, but considered 
them as a "normal use of funds by a married couple" (R-117). 
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appeared that numerous of them made reference to other jobs, 
or to no job at all (T-39 to 54). The trial court viewed 
any construction expense as nothing more than an appropriate 
contribution in developing the marital estate, and further 
noted that the evidence wholly (trial transcript erroneously 
uses the word "only" for "wholly") failed to support defen-
dant's claim (T-110). 
During the marriage, the real property taxes on the 
home were paid by plaintiff's father, Frank Armstrong. The 
amount of taxes paid by him was $3,521.00. Mr. Armstrong 
also paid $3,500.00 for the installation of a water line, 
and $600.00 for the furnishing of sod. (T-22, 55, 96, 97, 
109). 
Both parties believed, and the Court so found, that the 
value of the home, including the lot, at the time of the 
divorce, was $250,000.00 (T-3, 107). 
The only other assets of the marriage were personal 
property items (which were disposed of by stipulation) and 
some original paintings that had been given to the parties 
by the husband's father (T-23, 57). 
Throughout the marriage, plaintiff was employed by the 
Univerity of Utah in the Registrar's Office (T-18). Her net 
salary was $540.00 every two weeks (T-19). Her entire 
salary was consumed during the marriage for living expenses 
(T-18). Plaintiff also had a retirement account in 
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connection with her employment at the University of Utah 
(T-19). The retirement account had a value of $587.23 when 
the parties were married. In December, 1982 (the time that 
the parties separated), the account had a value of 
$7,094.21. In September of 1984 (the time of trial), the 
account had a value of $10,588.22 (T-5, 6; Exhibit 9). 
It was also acknowledged by wife that she had debts of 
$3,417.11 coming into the marriage. These debts were paid 
during the marriage with marital income (T-7). 
No alimony or attorney's fees were claimed by either 
party (T-2). 
Based upon the above facts and evidence, the Court dis-
tributed the assets of the marriage in the following manner 
(R-122):6 
1. It was ordered that the home be sold. 
2. From the proceeds of sale, the Armstrongs were to 
be paid their existing interest in one-half of the lot, plus 
reimbursed for the taxes and improvements that they paid. 
3. The remaining net proceeds of sale were to be 
equally divided between the parties. Wife gets no credit 
for the $67,500.00 gift from her parents. 
4. Husband was awarded an amount equivalent to one-
half of the increase in wife's retirement account to the 
6
 See Appendix B for full copy of Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
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date of separation ($3,253.59). An adjustment for this 
credit was to be made in the distribution of the home sale 
proceeds. 
5. Wife gets no credit for the $10,000.00 in assets 
that she brought into the marriage. 
6. Husband was awarded all of the original paintings 
that were gifted to the parties from his father. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Under Utah case law, marital property is property 
acquired through the "joint efforts" of the parties. 
Preston v. Preston (Utah 1982), 646 P.2d 705; Jesperson v. 
Jesperson (Utah 1980), 610 P.2d 326. 
2. Utah case law recognizes that property acquired by 
inheritance is not acquired through the "joint efforts" of 
the parties. Preston v. Preston, supra. 
3. Property acquired by gift is not substantially 
different than property acquired by inheritance. While 
there is no Utah case law dealing specifically with gifts, 
other jurisdictions clearly recognize that gifted property, 
even made in the name of both spouses, is not marital prop-
erty.7 
4. The parol evidence rule does not apply at all to 
this case. Plaintiff is not attempting to vary the terms of 
a written document. Plaintiff does not dispute the 
1
 See Case Authority commencing on page 11 of this 
brief. 
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existence of legal titlef but contends that the state of 
title is not binding in distributing marital property. 
5. Under Utah law, plaintiff is entitled as a matter 
of law to be awarded the assets that she brought into the 
marriage. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT RESTORING TO WIFE 
THE GIFT OF PROPERTY FROM HER PARENTS 
§30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, provides in effect that 
when a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may make 
such orders relating to the disposition of property "as may 
be equitable". In determining what is "equitable", the 
court has never been bound by the names in which property is 
held. The state of title prior to the divorce decree is not 
binding on the court and the court is empowered to make any 
distribution that is just and equitable, and may compel con-
veyances to that end. Workman v. Workman (Utah 1982), 652 
P.2d 931; Jackson v. Jackson (Utah 1980), 617 P.2d 338. 
In the absence of some unusual circumstance, the court 
in recent years in determining what is equitable has con-
strued marital property to be such property as may have been 
acquired through the "joint efforts" of the parties. 
Preston v. Preston (Utah 1982), 646 P.2d 705? Jesperson v. 
Jesperson (Utah 1980), 610 P.2d 326. Thus in Jesperson, the 
- 10 -
court held that it was proper to award plaintiff assets 
brought into the marriage as they were not acquired through 
the "joint efforts" of the parties. And in Preston, it was 
held error not to award the husband the amount he brought 
into the marriage and contributed on a cabin, together with 
the proportion of appreciation in value attributable there-
to, before the value of the cabin was divided between the 
parties. Also in Preston, the court properly awarded to the 
wife all of the property she inherited, it being held that 
inheritance property is not acquired through the "joint 
efforts" of the parties. 
There is no logical distinction between property 
acquired from inheritance and property acquired by gift. 
Neither is acquired by reason of "joint efforts". Indeed, 
the facts of the instant case demonstrate that the gift of 
property by elderly parents to an only child was nothing 
more than an advance upon her inheritance. Appellant is not 
aware of any Utah case authority that specifically deals 
with the question of gifts as being marital or non-marital 
property; however, case law from other jurisdictions, both 
old and new, solidly supports the proposition that a gift to 
both spouses from the relatives of one spouse should be 
treated as if intended as a gift to the related spouse 
alone. Singer v. Singer (Ky. 1934), 68 S.W.2d 34; Hegel v. 
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Hegel (Fla. 1971)f 248 5.2d 212; Johnson v. Johnson (Neb. 
1981), 307 N.W.2d 783; Angel v. Angel (Ky. 1978), 562 S.W.2d 
661; Elliott v. Elliott (Mo. 1981), 621 S.W.2d 305. 
In Singer v. Singer, supra, the wife's father bought a 
house for the parties and conveyed it to the husband and 
wife jointly. In awarding the house to the wife, the 
Kentucky court made the following comment: 
"There is no dispute that the father bought the 
house and lot in Georgetown for his daughter. Her 
husband had the deed drawn to them jointly and the 
father and daughter both knew that the deed had been 
so drawn and the father said just let it stand. But 
very clearly it was property which came to the 
daughter from the father and on the divorce should 
be adjudged to her". 
In Hegel v. Hegel, supra, the husband claimed that he 
was entitled to one-half of property that had been conveyed 
to both spouses as tenants by the entireties. In rejecting 
the arguments of the husband, the Florida court stated: 
"As frequently happens, this case arrived in the 
trial court with the record or "paper" title to 
certain property being held jointly by the parties 
as tenants by the entireties. Ordinarily, the 
record title speaks for itself and upon divorce the 
parties become tenants in common. However, either 
party may establish an interest in the record or 
"paper" ownership of the other party under certain 
well-defined circumstances. 
Once a wife initially makes it appear that her 
separate funds supplied the entire consideration for 
the purchase of certain property, then, the husband's 
record or "paper" interest therein is in jeopardy. 
Under such circumstances there is no presumption of 
a gift to the husband of his record interest therein; 
on the contrary, the presumption arises that the 
husband is the trustee of a resulting trust with 
the wife as beneficiary thereof or that a special 
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equity exists in her favor as set forth above. In 
order to preserve his record interest the husband has 
the burden of establishing that a gift was, in fact, 
intended or of attempting to establish a "special 
equity" therein. 
In Johnson v. Johnson, supra, the Nebraska court made 
it clear in dividing the assets of a marriage that the trial 
court was entitled to consider that the wife contributed 
nothing toward the acquisition of certain properties and 
that the source of funds were gifts from the husband's 
mother. Under such circumstances, it was held that "a court 
may divide property between the parties in accordance with 
the equities of the situation, irrespective of how legal 
title is held". 
In Angel v. Angel, supra, property was conveyed by gift 
to both spouses from the wifefs brother. The property was 
treated as non-marital property and awarded to the wife. 
The court held that the property acquired by gift should be 
considered as the wifefs separate property unless the trial 
court finds that the husband was named as a grantee for some 
reason other than his marriage. 
In Elliott v. Elliott, supra, the court rejected the 
husband's contention that family heirlooms given to the 
parties by the wife's parents should be considered as gifts 
to both spouses. The heirlooms were shown to have been in 
the family for many generations and were treated as gifts to 
the wife alone. 
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In Workman v. Workman (Utah 1982), 652 P.2d 931, the 
Utah Court awarded property to both the husband and wife 
that had been conveyed from husband's mother. The reason 
that the property was awarded to both spouses was that the 
wife had used her separate funds to purchase the property 
from the husband's mother and to clear various pending 
liens. In making this award, the court totally ignored an 
earlier Quit-Claim Deed conveying the property to the hus-
band alone. 
The instant case falls squarely within the rule of the 
above authorities. The husband paid no consideration for 
the gifted property. Husband has shown no special equity, 
nor met his burden of showing that a gift to him was in fact 
intended. The husband was named as a grantee for financing 
purposes (T-16). Mr. Armstrong's proffered testimony was to 
the effect that the Armstrongs had no reason to make a gift 
to the husband except for the fact that he was married to 
their daughter. Under these circumstances, it is clear that 
the wife should have been awarded the value of the gift from 
her parents. 
In determining an "equitable" distribution of the 
assets, it is also difficult to justify the trial court's 
treatment of gifts from their respective parents. The gift 
from the wife's parent of the building lot was treated by 
the trial court as marital property and divided between the 
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parties. Yet the gift of the original paintings to both 
spouses by the husband's father was treated as non-marital 
property and the husband was awarded all of the paintings. 
Wife does not seriously believe that she should be awarded 
the paintings because she recognizes them as gifts from her 
husband's parents. Yet, by the same token, she urges in 
accordance with all of the authorities herein, that the gift 
from her own parents be awarded to her in a consistent 
manner. 
POINT II 
TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE IN 
REJECTING EVIDENCE FROM WIFE'S FATHER TO EXPLAIN THE GIFT 
It is important to note that this is not a case where 
the trial court considered the circumstances of the gift and 
then attempted to make a fair and equitable distribution of 
assets. Rather, it is a case where the trial judge believed 
that he could not go beyond the written document evidencing 
the gift and therefore considered that under the parol evi-
dence rule if the gift was made in writing to both parties 
the whole matter ended at that point and there was nothing 
further to decide (T-94). Plaintiff believes this to be 
patent error. 
The parol evidence rule is a rule of substantive law 
that prevents parties from offering extrinsic evidence to 
change or modify the terms of an unambiguous written 
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document. Rowley v. Marrcrest Homeowners Association (Utah 
1982), 656 P.2d 414; State Bank of Lehi v. Woolsey (Utah 
1977) , 565 P.2d 413. Plaintiff in the instant case is not 
attempting to change or modify the terms of any written 
agreement. She acknowledges the existence of said agreement 
in its present form. She even acknowledges that she re-
quested her father to draw the documents as they were drawn. 
What plaintiff does claim under the authorities cited in 
Point I is that the state of title as evidenced by written 
documents, whether ambiguous or unambiguous, simply isn't 
binding or even necessarily material when dividing assets in 
a divorce decree. And if the writing itself is not binding 
it logically follows that the court can, and should, look to 
all of the surrounding circumstances in order to make an 
equitable distribution. The power of the court to make 
equitable divisions of property is so fundamental that it 
cannot even be completely defeated by contract. Mathie v. 
Mathie (1961), 12 Utah 2d 116, 363 P.2d 779. 
Even if the parol evidence rule were to apply, this 
case would fall under one of its many exceptions. It is 
stated at Am. Jur.2d, Evidence, §1040, that extrinsic evi-
dence may be admitted to prove the circumstances under which 
a contract is made, wherever, without the aid of such evi-
dence, the contract cannot be applied to its proper subject 
matter. In Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz (1972), 28 Utah 
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2d 261; 501 P.2d 266, the court held that in determining the 
issue of completeness, parol evidence is admissible to show 
the circumstances under which the agreement was made and the 
purposes for which the agreement was executed. Also, it is 
always permissible to use parol evidence to show the actual 
consideration for a deed or agreement. Wood v. Roberts 
(Utah 1978), 586 P.2d 405. 
It is plaintiff's position that 1) the parol evidence 
rule doesn't apply at all to this case, and 2) even if it 
did apply, an exception would exist. None of the many cases 
cited by appellant herein that comment on the non-binding 
nature of the state of title even mention the parol evidence 
rule. Plaintiff urges that she is entitled to have the 
court consider evidence by her father explaining the cir-
cumstances of the gift. If Mr. Armstrong's proffered testi-
mony were admitted and considered by the trial court, it is 
quite obvious that the result of the case would be differ-
ent. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD WIFE THE 
ASSETS THAT SHE BROUGHT INTO THE MARRIAGE 
It was established by the evidence that the wife 
contributed $10,000.00 toward the construction of the home 
that was derived from assets that predated the marriage 
(T-19, 21, & 22). This contribution clearly was not 
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acquired through the "joint efforts" and should have been 
awarded to wife pursuant to the mandate of Jespersen v. 
Jespersen, supra, and Preston v. Preston, supra. In Pres-
ton, it was held error not to award the husband the amount 
he brought into the marriage and contributed on a cabin, 
together with the proportional appreciation in value attri-
butable to the contribution. 
Although the later case of Workman v. Workman, supra, 
states that the rule in Preston is not necessarily invari-
able, it would seem that there must be some other compelling 
reason or circumstance to cause the rule not to apply. Hus-
band will no doubt claim that his own financial contribu-
tions to the home is such an offsetting circumstance. There 
is however a drastic difference between plaintiff's 
$10,000.00 contribution and the claimed contributions of 
defendant. In the case of the $10,000.00 by the wife, the 
funds are clearly traceable to assets of the wife that she 
brought into the marriage (T-19, 21, 22). However, with 
respect to the husband, there is no evidence that he brought 
anything into the marriage. His claimed contributions, if 
any, came from his construction company which, but for the 
contributions, would have simply increased his income and in 
turn the marital estate. This assumes that he made any such 
contributions at all, which was a matter in dispute in which 
his evidence failed (T-110). 
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Wife acknowledges that her pre-existing debts of 
$3,417.11 should be taken into consideration in awarding 
premarital assets. Since the debts were paid with marital 
income (one-half of which would be the wife's) a setoff of 
$1,708.55 (or one-half of the amount of the debt) would be 
appropriate. With this adjustment, wife is entitled to be 
restored $8,291.45, plus the proportionate appreciation to 
the home. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based upon all of the arguments and authorities as 
cited herein, it is respectfully urged that the divorce 
decree of the District Court be modified in the following 
respects: 
1. That the appellant-wife be awarded the first 
$67,500.00 of net proceeds from the sale of the parties1 
home, which amount represents the value of the one-half 
interest in the lot given to the parties by the wife's 
parents. 
2. That in addition to the above, the appellant-wife 
be awarded $8,291.45, plus the proportionate appreciation to 
the home attributable to said amount, representing her 
contribution to the home from assets that predated the 
marriage. 
In the alternative, and in the event the court views 
the existing record insufficient to justify the relief 
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claimed, then the matter should be remanded to the lower 
court for either a new trial or instructions to reopen the 
trial and consider the evidence of Frank Armstrong relating 
to the circumstances of the gift. In such event, the court 
should instruct the trial court that wife is entitled to the 
relief claimed if the testimony of Frank Armstrong is as 
proffered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARM^TR^NG, RAWLINGS & WEST 
David E. West 
1300 Walker Center 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
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MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT made this 10th day of May, 1978, by and between 
FRANK ARMSTRONG and AFTON C. ARMSTRONG, his wife, hereinafter called 
the "Armstrongs", and WALTER SMITH and EVE A. SMITH, his wife, herein-
after called the "Smiths", 
WITNESSETH: 
That the Armstrongs on December 25, 1977 gave an undivided one-
half interest in the hereinafter described property to the Smiths with 
the understanding that it would be particularly described when the 
parties returned from a vacation, it was to provide that if the 
Smiths ever sold the property the Armstrongs would have the first 
right of refusal to purchase same, and 
WHEREAS, the Smiths want to build on the property and the company 
making the loan to the Smiths require that the property be made sub-
ject to a lien of the payment of s^id loan, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that the Arm-
strongs will transfer the entire tttle to said property for the purpose 
of securing a loan, but for this purpose only, and that the Smiths will 
immediately reconvey a one-half interest back to the Armstrongs. 
In the event of a sale or partition of the property, the Armstrongs 
will have no monetary interest in a^ ny improvements placed on the 
property, their interest being only in the land and not in such improve-
ments . 
In the event of a sale or conveyance of the property, the Armstrongs 
are hereby given the first right to purchase at the price a bona fide 
purchaser is willing to pay for it* such right to be exercised within 
thirty days after written notice o£ such contemplated sale is given to 
the Armstrongs; otherwise, this ri^ht shall become null and void. 
APPENDIX A 
EXHIBIT "A" 
Commencing at a point 752 feet South from the Northeast corner of Section 
22, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, and running thence 
East 6.17 feet; thence South 415 feet; .nence West 97«17 feet; thence North 
378 feet; thence Northwesteriy 178.p feet, more or less, to a point 266 
feet West of the point of beginnx»»ft, thence East 266 feet to beginning. Con-
taining one acre* 
Together with an easement and right of way for Ingress and egress and for 
water, sewer, power and gas lines and other public utilities over, In and 
upon the following described real property: Commencing 286 feet West of the 
Northeast corner of said Section 22, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake 
Meridian, and running thence South 752 feet; thence East 286 feet; thence 
North 25 feet; thence West 266 feet; thence North 727 feet; thence West 20 
feet to the point of beginning. 
Together with all water and water rights appurtenant to or used upon said 
premises, Including water and water rights In the Upper Ellison Ditch. 
m 
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PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
EVE A. SMITH, 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
v. ) 
) Case No. D-83-63 
WALTER THOMAS SMITH, ) 
) Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendant. ) 
* * * * * * * 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for 
trial on Thursday, the 20th day of September, 1984, the 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding. The plaintiff was 
present in person and represented by counsel, David E. West. 
The defendant was present in person and represented by counsel, 
David S. Dolowitz. The court heard and considered the testi-
mony of the parties and thesr respective witnesses, considered 
the exhibits introduced into evidence and being advised in the 
premises and having considered the arguments and representa-
tions of counsel, then considered the objections of the 
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APPENDIX B 
plaintiff to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of 1c 
and decree of divorce on December 17, 1984, now enters tl 
following as its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
L The plaintiff and defendant were residents 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, when this action was filed a 
had been so for more than three months prior to that date. 
2. The parties were married on September 4, 1977, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
3. The parties separated in December of 3 982 a 
this action has been pending before the courts since January 
1983. 
4. There have been no children born as issue of tl* 
marriage and none are expected. 
5. The defendant treated the plaintiff cruel! 
causing her great mental distress and suffering by, when th< 
interests diverged, refusing to discuss the problems confroi 
ing the parties and to work out a joint set of values 
activities to continue the marriage relationship. The d 
tress that she suffered as a result of the divergence of th 
values and activities made continuation of the marriage re 
tionship impossible. 
6. The defendant withdrew his counterclaim for 
vorce at the commencement of the trial. 
-2-
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7. Plaintiff expressed a desire, and the parties 
stipulated, that plaintiff could be awarded her maiden name of 
Eve Armstrong. 
8. The parties stipulated that there would be no 
request for alimony by either party or a request by either 
party for attorney fees or costs to be awarded. 
9. The parties stipulated that their personal 
property could be divided as shown on Exhibits 4-D, 6-D and 7-D 
which were stipulated into evidence. 
10. The parties stipulated that the home and real 
property acquired by them at 2662 East 6200 South should be 
sold; that the mortgage balance should be paid; and that Mr. 
land Mrs. Frank Armstrong, the parents of the plaintiff, were 
owners of an undivided one-half interest in the real property 
upon which the home had been built and they should be compen-
sated at the time of sale for the value of that ownership 
interest. 
11. The value of the home is $250,000.00 and it 
(should be listed for sale with Gump & Ayers Realtors, and, 
ideally, sold at that price. From the proceeds of sale, the 
parties should pay the mortgage balance, then Mr. and Mrs. 
Armstrong should be paid $67,500.00, which represents one-half 
| of the value of the land on which the home is built which is 
found to be $135,000.00. Mr. and Mrs. Armstrong should also be 
•
3
" il5 
reimbursed for contributions to the home and real property o 
the parties paid, for a total of $75,100.00. 
12. If the parties do receive $250,000.00 for thei 
home, after payment of the sums set out in paragraph 11 above 
there would be a net distribution to each party of $61,404.35 
From the plaintiff's share of this sum should be deduct€ 
$3,253.50 which represents one-half of her retirement at ti 
time of separation of the parties, it being agreed by tl 
parties that all of her retirement should be awarded to her a 
this is an offset for that property which is determined to be 
marital property and the sum of $3,253.50 should be added 
the proceeds of sale awarded to the defendant so that t 
plaintiff would receive, assuming receipt of $122,808.70, 
payment of $58,150.85, and the defendant a payment 
$64,657.85. 
I 13. A gift was made by Mr. and Mrs. Frank Armstrc 
Ito the plaintiff and defendant of an undivided one-half int€ 
i 
jest in the real property on which their home was built. : 
i |court finds from the written documents evidencing such giJ 
j 
that it was a gift to both parties and should be considered 
marital property. Each of the parties made contributions 
| construction of the home of property that they owned prior 
the marriage or accumulated during the marriage of the part 
in the form of contributions by the plaintiff of her savi 
and the defendant of money from the construction company which 
he operated. Plaintiff and defendant's evidence failed to 
establish that their contributions were other than that and 
should be considered as having been placed into the home as 
part of the normal use of funds by a married couple during the 
course of their marriage. 
14. The defendant owned prior to the marriage of the 
parties, a number of paintings and watercolors that had been 
painted by his father and the parties were given five paintings 
and watercolors by the defendant's father during the course of 
the marriage. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
makes and enters the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The plaintiff should be awarded a decree of 
divorce terminating the marriage of the parties, which decree 
should become final upon entry. 
2. No alimony should be awarded to either party. 
3. No costs or attorney fees should be awarded to 
either party. 
I 4. Plaintiff should be awarded her maiden name of 
Eve Armstrong. 
5. The plaintiff should be awarded as her sole and 
separate property the following items of personal property: 
-5- * * f7 
Plastic endtable 
One-four-piece couch 
One chrome lamp 
Seven needlework pillows 
One large white coffee table 
Two single beds 
Directors chair 
One plastic bookshelf unit 
One antique desk and chair 
Redwood table and bench set 
The proceeds from the sale of the 1972 
Ford Bronco 
Oakleaf graphic 
1977 Datsun 
Oak table and chairs 
Oak coffee table 
One washer 
One dryer 
One large Mexican rug 
Three oak dressers 
Two portable color TV sets 
Small general kitchen appliances 
Queen-size bed 
Magazine rack 
Her crystal collection 
The oak bookshelf 
Medium graphic 
One-half of the dishes, silverware and 
cooking utensils acquired during t 
course of the marriage by the parties a 
all of the dishes, silverware, and coc 
ing utensils acquired by her prior to t 
marriage of the parties 
Microwave oven 
Brass lamp 
Hideabed sofa 
Four bookcase units 
6. The defendant should be awarded as his sole < 
separate property the following items of personal property: 
The upright freezer 
Stereo 
His books 
Brass lamp 
Queen-sized bed 
TV table 
lis 
Two bucket chairs 
Large beanbag 
Magazine rack 
Drafting table 
Black and white portable TV 
Patio table and chairs 
Power saws and equipment 
His personal effects and belongings 
His tools 
Canvas rocking chair 
Sofa and chair set 
One oak endtable 
Refrigerator 
Three oak barstools 
One small Mexican rug 
Oak desk unit 
Tall oak dresser 
Two low oak dressers 
One oak headboard 
Dishes, silverware and cooking utensils 
that he brought into the marriage and 
one-half of the dishes, silverware and 
cooking utensils acquired by the parties 
after their marriage 
One large graphic 
One small cloth print 
Bed lamp 
Crystal wineset 
Bar supplies 
7. The home and real property acquired by the 
parties during the course of their marriage at 2662 East 6200 
South should be listed for sale and sold, ideally, for 
$250,000.00. The proceeds of sale should be utilized first to 
pay the costs and expenses of sale and the existing mortgage 
obligation of approximately $52,000.00. Then, Mr. and 
Mrs. Frank Armstrong - should be paid $75,100.00. The remain-
ing balance should be divided equally between the parties, pro-
vided, however, that after dividing the proceeds equally, the 
i^  
sum of $3,253,50 shall be subtracted from the funds to be pai 
to the plaintiff. Eve Smith, and shall be added to the funds t 
be paid to defendant/ Walter Smith. If the sale were t 
achieve the proceeds envisioned by the parties, the ne 
proceeds of the sale for division would be $122/808.69, an 
after adjustment as heretofore stated, the sum of $58,150.8 
would be paid to the plaintiff and $64,657.85 to th 
defendant* These sums would be adjusted as required in orde 
to divide the net proceeds of sale if they are other than tl 
$250,000.00 upon which the court based its conclusions and i 
reimburse Mr. and Mrs. Frank Armstrong for additional coi 
tributions to the home and real property of the parties f 
payment of newly accrued taxes. 
8. The property at 2662 East 6200 South shall 
listed in Gump & Ayers for sale unless the parties agree 
another real estate agent to handle the sale for them. 
9. The plaintiff should be awarded the retireme 
fund accumulated by her at the University of Utah. 
10. The paintings by the defendant's father should 
awarded to the defendant.t 
DATED thj ns ^^^day of V\9rppher, 198/. 
IPS FJtBGE'MCK 
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Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, on this 37 day of 
March, 1985. 
